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INTRODUCTION 
When the American media displayed images of federal agents re-
moving stacks of cash from former Congressman William Jefferson’s 
refrigerator, the public’s cynicism regarding the integrity of members 
of Congress reached an all time high.  Jefferson’s frozen cash and 
other recent examples of public corruption have perpetuated the im-
age of politicians as self-interested wrongdoers who are for sale to the 
highest bidder.  Although these high profile examples generate con-
sensus about the appropriateness of criminal sanctions for egregious 
instances of public corruption, the clear solution for more implicit 
forms of bribery involving campaign contributions continues to evade 
election law scholars, government officials, and federal courts.1  
Complicating this issue is the central role of privately funded cam-
paigns in American elections and the idea that government officials 
should be able to actively solicit campaign contributions in order to 
run successful campaigns.2  Likewise, the Supreme Court has af-
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 1 See generally Ilissa B. Gold, Note, Explicit, Express, and Everything in Between:  The 
Quid Pro Quo Requirement for Bribery and Hobbs Act Prosecutions in the 2000s, 36 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261 (2011) (discussing how different courts have defined the scope 
of what constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act); Jane Fritsch, The Envelope, Please; A 
Bribe’s Not a Bribe When It’s a Donation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/28/ weekinreview/the-envelope-please-a-bribe-s-not-
a-bribe-when-it-s-a-donation.html (noting that “[t]he courts have struggled with the cam-
paign-contribution issue” due to the difficulty in showing explicit evidence of a quid pro 
quo). 
 2 See Lauren Garcia, Note, Curbing Corruption or Campaign Contributions?  The Ambig-
uous Prosecution of “Implicit” Quid Pro Quos Under the Federal Funds Bribery Statute, 
65 RUTGERS L. REV. 229, 230 (2012) (“American election campaigns and political plat-
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firmed the First Amendment’s protection of campaign contributions 
and independent expenditures for those running for elected office in 
the United States.3  Thus, any reforms in this area must strike a care-
ful balance to avoid violating the First Amendment. 
As interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, the ex-
change of a campaign contribution in return for an explicit promise 
by a public official to perform or not to perform an official act vio-
lates federal law.4  Although the case law is unclear, some courts have 
held that “wink and nod” relationships between members of Con-
gress and campaign contributors do not constitute a violation of pub-
lic corruption statutes—even though these relationships may still un-
dermine the integrity of the democratic process.5  Moreover, federal 
circuit courts have reached inconsistent results in interpreting 
whether a quid pro quo agreement in the context of campaign con-
tributions needs to be “express” or “explicit.”6 
Accordingly, this Essay attempts to fill the void in this topic by ar-
guing that implicit quid pro quo agreements between members of 
Congress and campaign contributors are worthy of disclosure.  These 
implicit relationships pose great challenges for America’s campaign 
finance system because they undermine the integrity of the demo-
cratic process by allowing campaign contributions to function as an 
improper means of influence over actions taken by public officials.  
However, the distinction between explicit and implicit quid pro quo 
agreements is not without merit when penalizing these types of rela-
tionships.  Hence, this Essay argues that the most desirable way of ad-
dressing implicit quid pro quo agreements involving campaign con-
tributions or independent expenditures is through non-criminal 
remedies that impose civil fines on members of Congress who fail to 
disclose these relationships under a new statute.  The first part of this 
statute would require members of Congress to disclose solicitations 
when the member of Congress “knowingly” requests a campaign con-
 
forms have historically been privately funded; public officials have an interest in soliciting 
contributions in order to represent and serve their constituents.”). 
 3 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (“The expenditure limitations con-
tained in the Election Campaign Act of 1971 represent substantial rather than merely 
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.”). 
 4 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) (“[I]f the payments are made in 
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform 
an official act . . . . This is the receipt of money by an elected official under color of offi-
cial right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.”). 
 5 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The in-
ducement from the official is criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his words and 
actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so interprets it.”). 
 6 Garcia, supra note 2, at 231. 
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tribution or independent expenditure that is reasonably likely to re-
turn a tangible benefit to the contributor.  The second part of this 
statute would require the member of Congress to disclose campaign 
contributions and independent expenditures offered or made by the 
contributor.  The final part of this statute would authorize the De-
partment of Justice to file civil actions against members of Congress 
who fail to comply with these disclosure requirements. 
Part I of this Essay provides an overview of important statutes used 
to prosecute federal, state, and local officials for bribery and unlawful 
gratuities violations.  Part II of this Essay explains how federal courts 
have interpreted and applied federal bribery statutes.  Next, Part III 
argues that the Court properly interpreted federal law to prohibit ex-
plicit quid pro quo agreements, but that there is a need for addition-
al remedies to deal with “wink and nod” agreements.  Without an ad-
ditional remedy, campaign contributions can effectively function as 
“implicit bribes” so long as there is an absence of an explicit quid pro 
quo agreement.  This Part contends that current criminal law penal-
ties are generally ineffective in deterring implicit bribery because of 
an individual’s relative ease in avoiding explicit agreements.  Moreo-
ver, Part III argues that the political nature of criminal investigations 
by overly aggressive prosecutors is an additional problem plaguing 
federal enforcement of bribery laws. 
Part IV advocates for reform by proposing a statute that assesses 
civil penalties on members of Congress who fail to disclose campaign 
contributions that may not qualify as explicit quid pro quo promises, 
but still function as a form of implicit bribery.  Moreover, this Part 
recognizes that a problem exists when overly zealous prosecutors use 
their authority to prosecute instances of bribery when motivated by a 
political agenda.  Accordingly, this Part suggests ways for Congress to 
facilitate a more impartial process for enforcing bribery violations 
without risking an overly politicized process. 
I.  FEDERAL STATUTES REGULATING BRIBERY AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 
Few individuals would disagree over the necessity of criminalizing 
bribery—especially because the general public is generally harmed 
most by government officials who illegally benefit from their status as 
public servants.  Unsurprisingly, Congress has enacted several laws to 
deter and punish these corrupt practices.  This Part provides a brief 
overview of federal statutes targeting bribery and unlawful gratuities.  
Moreover, this Part explains how federal prosecutors often use the 
mail and wire fraud statutes and the Hobbs Act to prosecute state and 
local officials for public corruption. 
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Generally, most bribery statutes consist of five elements:  (1) a 
public official, (2) a corrupt intent, (3) a benefit with value to the 
public official, (4) an intent to influence the public official, and (5) a 
requirement that the intended influence be aimed at an official act.7  
Although the exact wording of federal bribery law varies, these com-
mon elements can be identified in most laws prohibiting bribery.8  
Despite the agreement on the benefits of prohibiting forms of public 
corruption, the United States does not have a cohesive set of federal 
laws targeting public corruption.9  Instead, corrupt agreements in-
volving elected officials are prohibited by an overlapping framework 
of federal laws.10 
One commonly cited example of federal law prohibiting bribery 
and unlawful gratuities is 18 U.S.C. § 201, which imposes fines and 
criminal sanctions for engaging in these acts.11  Section (b)(1) of this 
statute applies to individuals engaging in the act of bribing a public 
official and targets those who “directly or indirectly, corruptly give[], 
offer[] or promise[] anything of value to any public official . . . or of-
fer[] or promise[] any public official . . . to give anything of value to 
any other person or entity . . . .”12  Moreover, under section (b)(1), 
this provision prohibits those from offering bribes “with intent to in-
fluence any official act; or to influence such public official [] . . . to 
commit . . . or allow, any fraud . . . ; [] or to induce such public offi-
cial . . . to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful du-
ty . . . .”13 
Section (b)(2) of this statute applies to public officials and pro-
hibits them from “corruptly” demanding, seeking, accepting, or 
agreeing to receive or accept “anything of value personally or for any 
other person or entity.”14  However, this section imposes an additional 
requirement that whoever engages in this conduct must do so in re-
turn for being influenced “in the performance of any official act.”15  
Additionally, this section targets government officials who are in-
duced to take action or to omit to take action in a manner that vio-
 
 7 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Richard L. Hasen & Daniel P. Tokaji, Election Law:  Cases and 
Materials 608 (5th ed. 2012). 
 8 Id. at 607. 
 9 Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption:  A Comparative Analysis of International Corrup-
tion Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 793, 798 (2001). 
 10 Id. 
 11 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). 
 12 Id. § 201(b)(1). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. § 201(b)(2). 
 15 Id. § 201 (b)(2)(A). 
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lates his or her official duties.16  Section (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 201, which 
defines important terms found in this statute, explains that “public 
officials” includes “federal officials but not state and local officials.”17 
In addition to § 201(b) targeting bribery, § 201(c) of this statute 
prohibits the giving or receiving of an unlawful gratuity and imposes 
fines and criminal sanctions for violations.18  This section prohibits 
individuals from indirectly or directly providing anything of value to 
any public official “for or because of any official act . . . .”19  Similarly, 
this section prohibits federal public officials from indirectly or direct-
ly seeking, demanding, or agreeing to accept “anything of value per-
sonally for or because of any official act . . . .”20  However, unlike the 
provisions governing bribery, unlawful gratuity offenses apply to for-
mer and current public officials and do not require the actions be 
taken “corruptly.”21  Moreover, this section does not require any in-
tent and the public official must receive the unlawful gratuity person-
ally in order to constitute an offense.22 
Another federal bribery statute imposing criminal sanctions and 
fines is 18 U.S.C. § 666, which is known as the “federal funds bribery” 
statute.23  Congress enacted this law to prevent individuals from brib-
ing state and local government officials by awarding government con-
tracts that are subsidized by federal funds.24  Although § 666’s provi-
sions contain similar language as 18 U.S.C. § 201, this statute makes it 
illegal to bribe an officer, employee, or agent of any organization, 
state, or local government that receives more than $10,000 in federal 
funding during a one-year period.25  Overall, section (a)(1)(B) of 
§ 666 applies to the official being bribed, whereas section (a)(2) ap-
plies to the individual soliciting the bribe.26  Moreover, this statute au-
thorizes fines and up to a ten-year maximum prison sentence if indi-
viduals are found guilty of violating these provisions.27 
 
 16 Id. § 201 (b)(2)(B). 
 17 18 U.S.C. § 201(a); LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 608. 
 18 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). 
 19 Id. § 201(c)(1)(A). 
 20 Id. § 201(c)(1)(B). 
 21 LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 609. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Garcia, supra note 2, at 232. 
 24 Id. 
 25 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2006). 
 26 Id. § 666(a)(1)(B)–(a)(2).  
 27 Id. § 666(a)(2). 
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In 1988, Congress expanded the mail and wire fraud statutes to 
include a public corruption component.28  Traditionally, the federal 
mail and wire fraud statutes prohibited individuals from utilizing the 
mail or interstate wires in connection with a scheme to defraud.29  
Both of these statutes prohibit “any scheme or artifice to defraud” or 
obtaining money or property “by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises.”30  By amending this statutory 
scheme to combat corruption, Congress added § 1346 by defining 
“scheme . . . to defraud” to include actions that defraud another of 
the “intangible right of honest services.”31  However, Congress failed 
to adequately define “intangible right to honest services” when it first 
enacted this provision because this term is ambiguous.32  Until recent-
ly, this provision caused prosecutors and courts considerable head-
aches in determining the scope of honest services fraud.33  In Skilling 
v. United States, the Supreme Court partially alleviated this problem by 
declaring that the statute’s definition of “scheme or artifice to de-
fraud” only covers bribery and kickback schemes.34 
In addition to the action taken by Congress, the Supreme Court 
construed an important statute as prohibiting public corruption.35  
The Court construed the Hobbs Act, which originally targeted extor-
tion committed by members of organized crime, to prohibit bribery 
in certain circumstances.36  The Act defines the term “extortion” as 
“the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced 
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or 
under color of official right.”37  The Court concluded that federal prose-
cutors could use the Hobbs Act to prosecute public officials, includ-
ing state and local officials, for acting “under color of official right” in 
accepting payments that are made in return for an “explicit promise 
 
 28 Thomas M. DiBiagio, Politics and the Criminal Process:  Federal Public Corruption Pros-
ecutions of Popular Public Officials Under the Honest Services Component of the Mail 
and Wire Fraud Statutes, 105 DICK. L. REV. 57, 62 (2000). 
 29 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012) (codifying the mail fraud prohibition in § 1341 and 
the wire fraud prohibition in § 1343). 
 30 Id. §§ 1341, 1343. 
 31 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32 DiBiagio, supra note 28, at 63. 
 33 Id. 
 34 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010). 
 35 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); see also Charles N. Whitaker, Federal 
Prosecution of State and Local Bribery:  Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Ap-
proach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1629 (1992) (looking at historical interprations of the Hobbs 
Act).  
 36 Id. 
 37 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official 
act.”38  As will be further explained, this “explicit quid pro quo” viola-
tion of the Hobbs Act occurred in the context of a campaign contri-
bution functioning as a means of bribery.39 
Although the United States does not have a single, cohesive stat-
ute targeting public corruption, Congress has enacted several laws 
prohibiting public officials and individuals from engaging in bribery 
and accepting of unlawful gratuities.  Moreover, Congress has broad-
ened the scope of the wire and mail fraud statutes to cover acts in 
which federal, state, and local officials engage in schemes to defraud 
another’s “intangible right to honest services.”40  Finally, the Supreme 
Court has construed the Hobbs Act to prohibit instances where pub-
lic officials accept campaign contributions with an explicit quid pro 
quo agreement with contributors. 
II.  FEDERAL CASE LAW GOVERNING BRIBERY 
While Congress has enacted important statutes prohibiting brib-
ery and other forms of public corruption, the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have grappled with how properly to apply and interpret 
these statutes.  A background on the case law governing bribery is 
important for understanding the proposed statute that this Essay ad-
vances in later sections.  Accordingly, this Part briefly explains the 
Supreme Court’s most significant decisions related to bribery and 
explains how federal courts are struggling to come to a consensus 
over the proper application of the Court’s decisions in this area. 
In McCormick v. United States, the Supreme Court considered 
whether a conviction for extortion under the Hobbs Act required 
federal prosecutors to prove the existence of an explicit quid pro quo 
agreement between a public official and a campaign contributor.41  A 
member of the West Virginia legislature sponsored legislation bene-
fitting a specific cause supported by a physician interest group.42  In 
return, this group provided the legislator with a campaign contribu-
tion.43  After a grand jury indicted the legislator for violating the 
Hobbs Act by extorting payments “under color of official right,” the 
legislator argued a violation required an explicit quid pro quo ar-
 
 38 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273–74. 
 39 Id. at 260. 
 40 18 U.S.C. § 1346.  
 41 Id. at 274. 
 42 Id. at 259–60. 
 43 Id. 
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rangement.44  Agreeing with the legislator’s argument, the Supreme 
Court held that the Hobbs Act required an explicit quid pro quo ex-
change between contributor and public official for a campaign con-
tribution to be considered extortion under the Hobbs Act.45 
Shortly after the McCormick decision, another public corruption 
case prosecuted under the Hobbs Act appeared before the Supreme 
Court.46  In Evans v. United States, federal agents successfully con-
vinced a Georgia public official to support a rezoning proposal in ex-
change for a bribe.47  The Court held that passive acceptance of a 
bribe by a public official constituted a violation of the Hobbs Act even 
without the official taking any specific affirmative action in exchange 
for the benefit.48  The Court explained that “the Government need 
only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he 
was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for 
official acts.”49  Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion tried 
to provide guidance for how this decision fit within McCormick’s 
framework.50  Arguing that a quid pro quo agreement does not need 
to be express, Justice Kennedy explained that “the [public] official 
and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for 
otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and 
nods.”51  However, Justice Kennedy’s argument against an “express” 
requirement seemed to conflict with the requirement of an “explicit” 
agreement between the public official and campaign contributor un-
der McCormick.52 
In the aftermath of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Ev-
ans, federal courts have struggled over the distinctions between the 
express and explicit language and in what context these distinctions 
apply.53  Moreover, the Court did not explain whether Evans estab-
 
 44 Id. at 261, 265–66. 
 45 Id. at 273–74. 
 46 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 256 (1992). 
 47 Id. at 257. 
 48 Id. at 269–270 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 30 Pa. Super. 26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1906)). 
 49 Id. at 268. 
 50 See Gold, supra note 1, at 270–71 (analyzing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence). 
 51 Id. at 271 (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52 See id. at 270–71 (stating that there is tension between the requirement of explicitness in a 
quid pro quo agreement and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that a quir pro quo does not 
need to be express). 
 53 Steven C. Yarbrough, The Hobbs Act in the Nineties:  Confusion or Clarification of the 
Quid Pro Quo Standard in Extortion Cases Involving Public Officials, 31 TULSA L.J. 781, 
794–96 (1996). 
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lished a separate standard for prosecuting bribery outside of the 
campaign contribution context or whether Evans modified the stand-
ard set forth in McCormick.54  In addition, it remains unclear whether 
the explicit quid pro agreement as interpreted in McCormick and Ev-
ans applies to other federal bribery statutes such as § 666 federal 
funds bribery.55 
Hence, the circuit courts have been left to reconcile the require-
ment of explicitness in a quid pro quo agreement from McCormick 
with Justice Kennedy’s argument in Evans that a quid pro quo need 
not be “express” in order to violate the Hobbs Act.56  Without clear 
guidance from the Supreme Court on these questions, the circuit 
courts have split on some of these issues.57  The majority view among 
circuit courts is that Evans established a separate standard that applies 
in bribery cases outside of campaign contributions whereas McCormick 
applies exclusively in the campaign contribution context.58  Taking 
the minority view on this issue, the Eleventh Circuit reconciled 
McCormick and Evans by explaining that the quid pro quo need only 
be explicit, not express, and that an explicit agreement “may be ‘im-
plied from [the official’s] words and actions.’”59  Until the Supreme 
Court resolves this split, the confusion regarding the differences be-
tween “express” and “explicit” and other questions regarding McCor-
mick and Evans are likely to persist. 
Another recent Supreme Court decision that relates to Congress’s 
decision to amend the mail and wire fraud statutes is Skilling v. United 
States.60  Among other charges, federal prosecutors alleged that for-
mer Enron executive, Jeffrey Skilling, violated the wire fraud statute 
by seeking to “depriv[e] Enron and its shareholders of the intangible 
right of [his] honest services” by propping up Enron’s financial 
statements prior to bankruptcy.61  In response to this charge, Skilling 
 
 54 Id. at 794–95. 
 55 Garcia, supra note 2, at 239. 
 56 Gold, supra note 1, at 271–72. 
 57 Id. at 271. 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 936–38 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 
245, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Unit-
ed States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 59 United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 60 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2908 (2010); see also John S. Gawey, Note, The Hobbs Leviathan:  The Dan-
gerous Breadth of the Hobbs Act and Other Corruption Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 
413 (2011) (discussing the Skilling decision). 
 61 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2908 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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alleged that § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague.62  Agreeing with 
Skilling, the Supreme Court narrowed this provision by declaring that 
the statute’s definition of “scheme or artifice to defraud” only covers 
bribery and kickback schemes.63 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s important decisions in 
McCormick and Evans, the circuit courts’ decisions demonstrate that 
federal courts far from agree on the proper scope and interpretation 
of the explicit and express agreements in the context of campaign 
contributions.  However, as will be discussed in the next Part, the 
complex issues raised by bribery involving campaign contributions 
raise far more challenging questions than the confusion facilitated by 
the explicit-or-express distinction. 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE SYSTEM:  THE MCCORMICK STANDARD, THE 
INADEQUACY OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED 
ENFORCEMENT. 
Even aside from the uncertainty with respect to the quid pro quo 
requirement for bribery and extortion, other important problems re-
lated to federal bribery laws pose great challenges for policymakers 
and federal judges.  Three are especially significant.  First, the Court 
in McCormick properly interpreted the statute to require an explicit 
agreement or promise, but there is a need for additional remedies to 
deal with “wink and nod” agreements.  Without an additional reme-
dy, campaign contributions can effectively function as “implicit 
bribes” so long as there is an absence of an explicit quid pro quo 
agreement.  Similarly, criminal penalties for bribery are both ineffec-
tive and undesirable for implicit quid pro quo agreements.  Finally, 
the expansive discretion of politically motivated prosecutors in en-
forcing bribery laws presents a major challenge in the current system. 
A.  Implicit and Explicit Bribes and Constitutional Considerations 
Among the challenging problems facing government officials is 
the artificial delineation of campaign contributions as legitimate or 
illegitimate by the Court’s decision in McCormick.  Because the 
McCormick standard requires an explicit agreement, public officials 
can still seek bribes without promising an explicit benefit in return—
 
 62 Id. at 2925. 
 63 Id. at 2932. 
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all without violating the Hobbs Act.64  For instance, if a lobbyist pro-
vides an elected official with a sum of money to introduce legislation 
on his or her behalf or to vote on a bill in a particular way, then the 
two individuals are obvious criminals under federal law.65  On the 
other hand, a campaign contributor can provide an elected official’s 
campaign with large sums of money and the public official can easily 
return favors to this contributor through a “wink and nod” relation-
ship.66  Likewise, public officials and individuals seeking influence can 
arrange for large independent expenditures on behalf of the public 
official in exchange for a benefit.  As long as the contributor, or in-
dependent spender, and the public official do not explicitly arrange 
for this agreement, then it is legal under McCormick as an “implicit” 
bribe.67 
Despite this distinction facilitated by the Court in McCormick, the 
practical difference between explicit and implicit agreements involv-
ing campaign contributions in terms of public corruption is immate-
rial.68  Indeed, Justice John Paul Stevens recognized this problem in 
his dissenting opinion in McCormick by stating, “Subtle extortion is 
just as wrongful—and probably much more common—than the kind 
of express understanding that the Court’s opinion seems to re-
quire.”69  Further, without meaningful reform, these relationships in-
volving campaign donations will continue to undermine the public’s 
trust and confidence in the ability of elected officials to make objec-
tive decisions in the best interest of the public.70 
However, this problem involving “implicit” forms of bribery with 
campaign contributions is not so simple.  Under the Hobbs Act, the 
easy solution to this problem would allow federal prosecutors to bring 
extortion charges against public officials who accepted or solicited 
campaign contributions without an express agreement to provide a 
corresponding benefit.  The only problem with this potential solution 
is the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.  Alt-
hough the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not include campaign 
 
 64 Jeremy N. Gayed, “Corruptly”:  Why Corrupt State of Mind Is an Essential Element for 
Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1731, 1770 
(2003). 
 65 Fritsch, supra note 1. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Dennis F. Thompson, Mediated Corruption:  The Case of the Keating Five, 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 369, 374–75 (1993). 
 69 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 282 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70 Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law and Politics:  A Modern 
Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 42 (1996). 
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contributions as explicitly protected by the text of the First Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has affirmed the fundamental role of cam-
paign contributions and expenditures functioning as protected polit-
ical speech under the First Amendment.71  The ability of public 
officials to solicit campaign contributions and the freedom of indi-
viduals to donate campaign contributions enjoy constitutional protec-
tion.72 
Thus, simply allowing federal prosecutors to bring charges against 
public officials for implicit bribery involving campaign contributions 
or independent expenditures could be problematic.  For instance, say 
an interest group against a specific provision of a federal farm bill 
provided a $500 campaign contribution to a member of Congress 
who the group believed would align with its interests—without an 
implicit agreement that the member would provide a benefit.  Later, 
the member of Congress changes the provision in the farm bill and 
meets with this group a few times.  If prosecutors could bring crimi-
nal charges against the group or the member of Congress by alleging 
an implicit agreement, then this may chill both the legislator’s meet-
ing with the group and the group’s donation because of fear of pros-
ecutors “linking” this arrangement as an implicit quid pro quo ex-
change. 
Further complicating this problem is the fact that privately funded 
campaigns have maintained an essential role in American elections.  
In fact, raising large sums of money through campaign contributions, 
whether this is desirable or not, is a fundamental aspect of the Amer-
ican political system.73  Raising campaign contributions has become 
so important to the re-election efforts of public officials, that wide-
spread concerns have developed about the amount of time members 
of Congress must spend fundraising in order to be competitive for re-
election.74  With dim hopes of presidential candidates accepting pub-
lic financing in the near future and without a corresponding scheme 
of public financing for members of Congress, the vital role of private-
ly funded campaigns and the importance of campaign contributions 
is unlikely to change soon.75  Hence, any reform in this area needs to 
 
 71 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,16–19 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that contributions 
and expenditures are speech protected by the First Amendment). 
 72 Id. at 19. 
 73 Jason B. Frasco, Note, Full Public Funding:  An Effective and Legally Viable Model for 
Campaign Finance Reform in the States, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 735–37 (2007). 
 74 Id. at 737. 
 75 See Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 283, 327–28 (2010) (considering ideas for campaign finance reform). 
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be carefully executed to avoid chilling constitutionally protected po-
litical speech or stifling campaign activities. 
After examining the constitutional and political considerations 
making this problem more complex than at first glance, the ultimate 
question becomes how to regulate implicit bribes in the context of 
campaign contributions without rendering these reforms as constitu-
tionally suspect.  Before evaluating how to address this tension, it is 
worth discussing two other problems related to bribery involving 
campaign contributions. 
B.  The Inadequacy of Criminal Sanctions 
Despite constitutional issues related to bribery and campaign con-
tributions, other problems with federal statutes relate to the adequacy 
and desirability of criminal sanctions for those who violate public cor-
ruption laws.  First, this Part argues that the current criminal penal-
ties that are imposed for violating an explicit quid pro quo exchange 
are generally ineffective in deterring implicit forms of public corrup-
tion—especially bribery.  Second, this Part contends that imposing 
criminal penalties on public officials or those seeking influence based 
on implicit agreements are inappropriate given the devastating ef-
fects these penalties can have on an individual’s personal life, career, 
and freedom. 
Although the Supreme Court’s delineation of illegitimate and le-
gitimate campaign contributions may have appealed to lower courts 
because of the appearance of a bright-line rule involving “explicit” 
agreements, the McCormick test has certainly caused headaches for 
prosecutors.76  On one hand, this distinction has allowed prosecutors 
to successfully convict public officials when the official maintains rec-
ords of their interactions with those seeking influence or when clear 
evidence exists of these illicit agreements.  For instance, former Sena-
tor Bob Packwood maintained diary entries that detailed his interac-
tions with third parties and provided clear evidence of explicit quid 
pro quo agreements involving campaign contributions.77  Likewise, 
former Congressman Randy “Duke” Cunningham kept detailed rec-
ords of his bribes based on the price paid and the project requested.78  
 
 76 See Alexa Lawson-Remer, Note, Rightful Prosecution or Wrongful Persecution?  Abuse of Honest 
Services Fraud for Political Purpose, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1318 (2009) (stating that there 
are problems distinct to public corruption prosecutions). 
 77 S. Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1994); Fritsch, 
supra note 1. 
 78 Nick Stewart, Striking the New Balance:  Redefining Earmarking in the Post Randy 
“Duke” Cunningham World, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 919, 922 n.12 (2010). 
1448 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
In other instances, undercover federal agents can provide taped evi-
dence of a public official’s willingness to engage in an agreement in-
volving campaign contributions. 
On the other hand, this clear distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate campaign contributions is problematic for prosecutors in 
most cases because usually legislators and public officials are intelli-
gent enough not to keep extensive paper trails detailing their explicit 
quid pro quo arrangements.  Without documented evidence, the 
prosecutor is left without sufficient proof to secure a conviction for 
violating the Hobbs Act.79  Because public officials and individuals 
seeking influence know they are unlikely to be prosecuted as long as 
they do not keep records of their exchanges, politicians can easily 
evade criminal liability.80  Therefore, the line between explicit and 
implicit quid pro quo agreements in this context is insufficient in de-
terring implicit forms of corruption when public officials can easily 
circumvent prosecution. 
Even in the late 1990s, one Washington D.C. lawyer who previous-
ly represented politicians in corruption cases remarked, “[I]t is hard 
for a prosecutor to make a campaign contribution look like a bribe 
unless there is ‘the most explicit evidence’ of a quid pro 
quo . . . people seem to have smartened up to where they don’t have 
those conversations and writings.”81  With the line between illegal and 
legal clearly drawn, public officials can avoid crossing the illegal line 
with simple “wink and nods” that evade criminal liability.82  Regard-
less of the explicitness, the problem of public corruption still lingers 
in these implicit agreements because they facilitate unequal access 
and influence over politicians based on the contribution or inde-
pendent expenditure. 
Aside from the ease with which politicians can evade explicit 
agreements and thus prosecution under the Hobbs Act, the question 
becomes whether criminal sanctions are appropriate for implicit 
agreements involving campaign contributions.  While criminal sanc-
tions are appropriate for egregious violations of bribery statutes, im-
posing criminal sanctions on public officials and campaign contribu-
tors for “wink and nod” relationships is undesirable for a number of 
reasons.  Foremost among these reasons is the risk of chilling legiti-
mate contributions or solicitations by criminalizing implicit quid pro 
quo agreements.  Because the line between explicit and implicit quid 
 
 79 Fritsch, supra note 1. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 628. 
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pro quo agreements is not clear in all cases, criminalizing implicit 
forms of bribery involving campaign contributions could chill pro-
tected activity altogether.83  If an individual could be prosecuted for 
donating to a member of Congress’s campaign, even without a pre-
conceived implicit agreement with the legislator, contributors could 
fear criminal liability if a benefit from the legislator eventually makes 
its way in their direction.  Accordingly, the contributor would be 
chilled into not donating to the public official’s campaign.  Likewise, 
members of Congress may fear that soliciting campaign contributions 
could result in criminal liability if implicit agreements are criminal-
ized, which would also decrease their likelihood of engaging in con-
stitutionally protected activities.84 
Furthermore, criminalizing implicit forms of bribery is inappro-
priate because of the idea that criminal penalties should be reserved 
for serious forms of immoral behavior that are deserving of more se-
vere repercussions.85  As will be discussed more extensively in the fol-
lowing section, allowing prosecutors the discretion to bring criminal 
charges against public officials and contributors for “implicit agree-
ments” could ignite a new storm of politically motivated witch hunts 
where members of Congress face harsh criminal sanctions for con-
duct that is inherently political—not criminal.86 
While the explicit quid pro quo requirement does little to deter 
public officials from engaging in implicit forms of bribery involving 
campaign contributions, imposing criminal sanctions on these types 
of agreements is neither an appropriate nor desirable solution.  
Hence, reform must carefully assess these constitutional and criminal 
law considerations to avoid sabotaging a meaningful and effective so-
lution.  Before outlining this solution, the next Part considers the 
problems that result from prosecutorial discretion and politically mo-
tivated enforcement of bribery violations more closely. 
C.  Politically Motivated Prosecution and Enforcement 
The problems associated with bribery and campaign contributions 
are not limited to the adequacy of criminal penalties.  Instead, the 
enforcement of these laws raises concerns when prosecutors abuse 
 
 83 John L. Diamond, Reviving Lenity and Honest Belief at the Boundaries of Criminal Law, 
44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 19 (2010). 
 84 See supra Part III.A for an example demonstrating this point. 
 85 See Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 
560–62 (2012) (“[C]ongress clearly viewed illegal-gratuities offenses as distinct from, and 
far less blame-worthy than, bribery.”). 
 86 Diamond, supra note 83, at 19. 
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their discretion by bringing public corruption charges for political or 
career-oriented purposes.  First, this Part argues that current bribery 
laws allow federal prosecutors expansive discretion to bring actions 
for bribery and other related offenses under the Hobbs Act, and the 
mail and wire fraud statutes.  Moreover, this Part argues that crimi-
nalizing implicit agreements between legislators and campaign con-
tributors could compound the problems associated with prosecutorial 
discretion, which supports non-criminal penalties as the most desira-
ble mechanism of regulating implicit quid pro quo agreements. 
Despite claims that federal prosecutors occupy an independent 
role by serving in the Department of Justice, such assertions are over-
ly idealistic.  United States Attorneys are appointed by the President, 
serve at pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief, and are thus political 
appointees.87  Generally, federal prosecutors are provided with a wide 
degree of discretion when deciding whether to file charges against an 
individual or entity.88  Given this expansive discretion, federal prose-
cutors often face external pressures from members of Congress, the 
White House, and other elected officials to initiate investigations or 
charges that are politically motivated.89  Furthermore, politics can 
play a major role in prosecutorial discretion when U.S. Attorneys 
conduct investigations and instigate prosecutions that are aimed at 
furthering their own careers in public service.90  Thus, public corrup-
tion statutes can be used as a powerful weapon when federal prosecu-
tors are motivated by political or personal calculations. 
Under § 1346’s definition91 of “scheme or artifice to defraud,” the 
wire and mail fraud statutes are particularly susceptible to being used 
by prosecutors for political means because of this provision’s broad 
scope and flexible standards for proving violations.92  Indeed, numer-
ous examples have occurred in recent times and can have extremely 
damaging effects on the targeted public official’s personal lives, ca-
reers, and liberty.  For example, federal prosecutors brought criminal 
charges against former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman for violat-
 
 87 Lawson-Remer, supra note 76, at 1310. 
 88 Id. at 1312. 
 89 Id. at 1316. 
 90 Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion:  What’s Politics Got to Do with It?, 18 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 739, 752 (2005). 
 91 18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
 92 Lawson-Remer, supra note 76, at 1291; see also Anthony J. Gaughan, The Case for Limiting 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction over State and Local Campaign Contributions, 65 ARK. L. REV. 587, 
590, 598 (2012) (“Section 1346 empowers the Justice Department to substitute its own 
judgment of what constitutes a corrupt campaign contribution for the judgment of state 
legislatures across the country.”). 
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ing § 1346 by committing honest services fraud.93  After Siegelman’s 
conviction and subsequent appeal process, it was revealed that gross 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred in this case because of political 
calculations.94  The political motivations may have originated from 
the fact that Siegelman was a popular Democrat in a traditionally 
conservative state while the Department of Justice was packed with 
George W. Bush appointees who may have wanted to capitalize on 
the governor’s missteps.95  Among the most egregious charges of 
prosecutorial misconduct in this case were that federal prosecutors 
knowingly relied on false evidence in securing Siegelman’s conviction 
and that these prosecutors also withheld exculpatory evidence from 
the defense.96  However, after a six-year legal battle involving numer-
ous appeals, Siegelman returned to prison in 2012 to serve a remain-
ing sixty-nine month sentence.97  The Siegelman example alone 
demonstrates how the political motivations of aggressive prosecutors 
hell-bent on a bribery conviction can destroy the career and liberty of 
a popular governor even if the prosecutors engage in misconduct. 
Another prominent example demonstrating the abuse of prosecu-
torial discretion is evidenced by the fate of former Alaska Senator 
Ted Stevens.  While the case against Stevens did not specifically in-
volve bribery charges, federal prosecutors brought charges against 
him for failing to disclose numerous expensive gifts he received, 
which included extensive renovations to one of his homes in Alaska.98  
In late October 2008, Stevens was convicted on all seven charges 
 
 93 United States v. Siegelman, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (detailing the 
various counts against Governor Siegelman, including a charge for “conspiracy to ‘de-
fraud and deprive the State of Alabama of its right to the honest and faithful services’ of 
Siegelman in his role as governor”). 
 94 See Scott Horton, CBS:  More Prosecutorial Misconduct in Siegelman Case, HARPER’S MAG. 
(Feb. 24, 2008, 9:18 PM), http://harpers.org/blog/2008/02/cbs-more-prosecutorial-
misconduct-in-siegelman-case-alleged/ (“In other words, not being able to beat 
Siegelman at the polls, Woods believes that his own party corruptly used the criminal jus-
tice process to take out an adversary.”). 
 95 Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Dangerous Power of the Prosecutor, 29 PACE L. REV. 1, 13–14 
(2008) (detailing the unusually tenacious nature of the investigation against Siegelman in 
proportion to the conduct under investigation). 
 96 See Gershman, supra note 95, at 13–14 (detailing the evidence showing that the prosecu-
tion of Siegelman was politically motivated); Horton, supra note 94 (“[T]he key evidence 
that the prosecutors brought forward was false, and they knew it was false.”). 
 97 Kim Chandler, Don Siegelman Returns to Prison Tuesday, AL.COM (Sept. 10, 2012, 7:40 PM), 
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2012/09/don_siegelman_returns_to_priso.html. 
 98 Elizabeth Cameron Hernandez & Jason M. Ferguson, The Brady Bunch:  An Examination of 
Disclosure Obligations in the Civilian Federal and Military Justice Systems, 67 A.F. L. REV. 187, 
207 (2011) (“The evidence presented at trial revealed that VECO Corporation, an oil ser-
vices company, remodeled Senator Stevens’[s] home.”). 
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brought against him99 and narrowly lost re-election the following 
month despite being the longest-serving Republican senator in histo-
ry.100  However, in December 2008, an FBI agent came forward and 
accused the prosecution team of committing numerous forms of mis-
conduct in the Stevens case.101  Prosecutors purposefully withheld ex-
culpatory evidence from the defense and were alleged to have sent a 
key witness back to Alaska knowing he would provide favorable testi-
mony to the defense.102  By early 2009, a federal court set aside Ste-
ven’s conviction and Attorney General Eric Holder began an official 
investigation into the numerous allegations of prosecutorial miscon-
duct.103 
The Stevens and Siegelman examples demonstrate the devastating 
effects of federal authorities bringing public corruption charges that 
may be warranted, but are tainted by prosecutorial misconduct as a 
result of improper motivations.  Hence, in proposing meaningful re-
form, Congress and other federal agencies must find ways to ensure 
impartiality when conducting investigations that involve bribery and 
other forms of public corruption.  Without ensuring increased inde-
pendence in the manner in which federal prosecutors investigate and 
bring bribery charges, the public’s trust in those who investigate cor-
rupt politicians may be undermined by the improper motivations of 
these prosecutors.  More importantly, without meaningful reform to 
prevent these abuses, public officials’ careers, lives, and families will 
continue to be at the mercy of aggressive federal prosecutors. 
Similarly, reform that would allow federal prosecutors the authori-
ty to bring bribery criminal charges for an implicit agreement involv-
ing campaign contributions would compound the problems that al-
ready exist with prosecutorial discretion.  If federal prosecutors could 
bring criminal charges against a public official for receiving a cam-
paign contribution based on evidence that demonstrated less than an 
explicit agreement, then these prosecutors could be even more em-
powered to declare political conduct as criminal.104  With the essential 
 
 99 Id. at 208. 
100 Paul Kane, Ted Stevens Loses Battle for Alaska Senate Seat, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2008, availa-
ble at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-11-19/politics/36878154_1_republican-
in-senate-history-gail-fenumiai-alaska-republican-party/. 
101 See Hernandez & Ferguson, supra note 98, at 209 (“Most importantly, Agent Joy revealed 
that the prosecutors purposefully withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See Diamond, supra note 83, at 19 (“At least three circuits have attempted to reconcile 
McCormick and Evans by suggesting express agreements are required for campaign con-
tributions, but not other payments.” (footnote omitted)). 
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role of privately funded campaigns, public officials cannot avoid 
fundraising.  Soon, public officials of opposing political parties could 
become the prime target of federal prosecutors looking to taint the 
official’s re-election hopes by bringing criminal charges for an implic-
it agreement.105  Thus, criminalizing implicit quid pro quo arrange-
ments that involve campaign contributions may serve to strengthen 
prosecutorial discretion by broadening the scope of charges for 
which prosecutors can target public officials for political purposes. 
Although federal prosecutors maintain a vital role in bringing 
those who violate public corruption statutes to justice, expansive dis-
cretion can create major problems with how the federal government 
enforces its laws.  In working to solve these problems, criminalizing 
implicit agreements between legislators and campaign contributors is 
not the proper solution.  Criminalizing implicit relationships could 
compound the problems associated with prosecutorial discretion, 
which is an additional factor supporting non-criminal penalties—a 
solution that will be fully addressed in the following Part of this Essay. 
IV.  REFORMING THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
With criminal sanctions too harsh and otherwise inappropriate for 
implicit agreements between public officials and campaign contribu-
tors, civil penalties and disclosure are the best means of overcoming 
these challenges.  Facing complicated constitutional issues, the cam-
paign finance system needs a standard that will provide meaningful 
reform by illuminating improper “wink and nod” relationships with-
out deterring protected political speech or campaign activities.  Addi-
tionally, the current system needs a more fair and independent pro-
cess of investigating instances where contributors and public officials 
act improperly.  The first part of this section proposes a statutory 
scheme that addresses the challenges created by implicit quid pro 
quo agreements.  The second part urges Congress to adopt proce-
dures that facilitate a more independent process of enforcing federal 
laws targeting public corruption. 
A.  The Creation of Civil Penalties for Implicit Bribes 
While the Supreme Court’s hostility toward direct limits on inde-
pendent expenditures has been well publicized in wake of Citizens 
United, the Court has generally been more receptive to disclosure re-
 
105 See id. at 19, 21. 
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quirements.106  Although the effectiveness of disclosure has been 
questioned among election law scholars,107 disclosure requirements 
still provide a number of benefits to voters, organizations, and the 
media by providing these groups with information that may not oth-
erwise be available and by allowing these groups to make more in-
formed decisions about who sits in Congress.108  Further, disclosure 
requirements may deter public officials and contributors from engag-
ing in improper agreements that taint the political system by granting 
unfair access and influence over the legislative process.109  According-
ly, this Part proposes a statute that imposes civil fines on members of 
Congress who fail to disclose implicit quid pro quo agreements in-
volving campaign contributions or independent expenditures. 
The first part of the proposed statute covers requests for cam-
paign contributions or independent expenditures initiated by a 
member of Congress or his or her staff members.  The italicized parts 
of this provision will be discussed in greater detail below.  Part (A) of 
this proposed statute reads: 
(A) A member of Congress who knowingly solicits, requests, seeks to ob-
tain, or obtains a campaign contribution or independent expenditure 
from an individual or group, where the member of Congress knows or 
should know that the individual or group is reasonably likely to have an 
interest in legislation or official actions taken by the member of Congress 
in his or her service on a committee or in general congressional service, 
must: 
Disclose such solicitation request, seeking of or receiving of campaign 
contribution or independent expenditure to the Federal Elections 
Commission within two weeks from the time in which the member of 
Congress’s campaign solicits, requests, or receives such contribution or 
within two weeks in which the independent expenditure is solicited, re-
quested, or made on behalf of the member Congress. 
Importantly, this statute includes a “knowingly” scienter require-
ment in order for a member of Congress to be required to disclose 
the request for a campaign contribution or independent expendi-
 
106 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (noting that dis-
closure requirements are preferable to a restriction of activity because “[t]ransparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions”). 
107 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 288 (2010) 
(“[I]t is doubtful that disclosure really enables the voters generally to police campaign fi-
nance practices.”); Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information 
Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1849 (2013) (arguing that “disclosure does not necessarily 
inform voters”). 
108 See Gilbert, supra note 107, at 1852 (“Yes, [disclosure] exposes the sources of speech, and 
that provides voters with information, just as Buckley and conventional wisdom hold.”). 
109 See Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 442–
43 (2012) (crediting disclosure for its anticorruption function). 
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ture.  This “knowingly” requirement would prevent trapping mem-
bers of Congress in situations where the member is reasonably weary 
of conflict of interest agreements and genuinely wants to avoid violat-
ing the provisions of this statute.  Moreover, this “knowingly” re-
quirement would also prevent politically motivated enforcement of 
this statute by overly aggressive prosecutors.  In situations where a 
member of Congress possesses a culpability that is less than “knowing-
ly,” the public official would not have to fear violating this statute giv-
en the large amount of time that these public officials spend raising 
money in order to secure re-election.  Finally, this “knowingly” stand-
ard would also prevent the chilling of First Amendment protected ac-
tivities since the member of Congress would be required to possess 
knowledge of the fact that the individual or group in which the 
member is requesting a contribution or expenditure is “reasonably 
likely” to have an interest in legislation or other official actions taken 
by the member on the individual or group’s behalf. 
Another important aspect of this statutory language is the re-
quirement that the member of Congress know or should know that 
the individual or group from which the member is making a request 
“is reasonably likely to have an interest in legislation or official ac-
tions taken by the member.”  In order to avoid risking this proposed 
law’s invalidation for constitutional vagueness, it is necessary to pro-
vide a definition for “to have an interest.”  Overall, this definition ap-
plies to both of the statute’s main sections (parts A and B) and the 
definition reads: 
“To have an interest” is defined as: 
(a) those situations in which an individual or group expressly requests or 
demands that a member of Congress or his or her staff members take 
some official action or omit to take some official action; or 
(b) other situations when an individual or group is reasonably likely to 
tangibly benefit from official actions or omissions taken by a member of 
Congress or his or her staff members and are thus inclined or induced to 
provide members of Congress with campaign contributions or independ-
ent expenditures that are reasonably likely to advance the tangible benefit 
sought by this individual or group. 
Again, it is necessary to discuss the italicized terms in greater de-
tail.  Part (a) of this definition is meant to trigger disclosure in situa-
tions where an individual or group “expressly” requests or demands 
that a member of Congress or his or her staff take official action or 
omit to take action in exchange for a campaign contribution or in-
dependent expenditure.  On the other hand, part (b) of this defini-
tion is meant to address situations not covered by part (a), where the 
individual or group offering a campaign contribution does not ex-
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plicitly ask for an official action by the member of Congress and thus 
may be seeking an implicit benefit from the legislator. 
The “tangibly benefit” requirement in part (b) is included to pro-
vide greater clarity to members of Congress in distinguishing when 
disclosure is required under this statute.  Overall, this definition is in-
tended to prevent disclosure for solicitations in which policy benefits 
are likely to accrue to those providing the contribution or expendi-
ture.  This “tangibly benefit” language would require more than inci-
dental access to the public official or purely policy benefits that may 
occur after the contribution or expenditure is made at the request of 
the member.  Instead, actions such as making earmarking requests, 
changing the text of legislation, providing favorable or unfavorable 
treatment to legislation in which the member sits on the committee 
where the legislation is pending, or advancing government contracts 
in which the individual or group has an interest are the types of “tan-
gible benefits” that this definition seeks to target for disclosure. 
Another part of this definition that is worth further discussion is 
the requirement that the contribution or expenditure be “reasonably 
likely to advance the tangible benefit sought by this individual or 
group.”  This language is necessary to prevent situations where an in-
dividual or group responds to the member of Congress’s request to 
make a contribution or expenditure, but provides a relatively small 
amount that is therefore unlikely to provide them with a tangible 
benefit in which they may have an interest.  For example, assume that 
a member of Congress requests an individual to provide a campaign 
contribution and the individual writes a check to the congresswom-
an’s campaign for $30.  Even if the individual has an interest in which 
the congresswoman is likely to have influence over, it is unlikely that 
a $30 contribution is “reasonably likely” to advance the tangible bene-
fit sought by the contributor when the congresswoman is likely receiv-
ing contributions or independent expenditures that are much larg-
er—and thus more likely to advance the tangible benefit sought.  
Thus, the congresswoman would not have to disclose this contribu-
tion under this definition. 
On the other hand, the second part of the proposed statute covers 
situations where campaign contributors or those providing inde-
pendent expenditures initiate the implicit quid pro quo agreement 
by approaching the legislator or her staff members.  Part (B) of this 
proposed statute reads: 
(B) A member of Congress who knows or has reason to know of an indi-
vidual or group that makes or offers a campaign contribution or inde-
pendent expenditure of which the individual or group is reasonably like-
ly to have an interest in legislation before or official actions taken by the 
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member of Congress in his or her service on a committee or in general 
congressional service, must: 
Disclose such campaign contribution or independent expenditure to the 
Federal Elections Commission within two weeks from the time in which 
the member of Congress’s campaign receives the contribution or within 
two weeks in which the independent expenditure is made on behalf of 
the member Congress. 
Again, this part of the statute incorporates the “knowingly” scien-
ter requirement and the same definition of “to have an interest in” 
would apply to this part of the statute for the same reasons addressed 
above.  The reason for requiring the member of Congress be the par-
ty to disclose these types of offers from individuals or groups is based 
on the idea that members of Congress are generally the better situat-
ed party disclose these implicit agreements.  Generally, the member 
of Congress is more likely to be aware of the reasonable benefits that 
will accrue to those providing the contributions or expenditures since 
the public official is the party in this relationship that holds the pow-
er to provide these tangible benefits in return for the contribution or 
expenditure. 
Moving along, the proposed statutory scheme also provides a def-
inition of “independent expenditure” and authorizes civil fines for 
members of Congress who fail to comply with this statute.  The final 
part of this proposed statute authorizes the Department of Justice to 
file a civil suit against the member of Congress for failing to comply 
with the disclosure provisions found in this law.  The definition of 
“independent expenditure” for purposes of this statute and the sec-
tions authorizing civil fines and suits provides: 
(C) For purposes of this scheme, an independent expenditure is made 
on behalf of a member of Congress when the expenditure indirectly or 
directly supports the member of Congress in being re-elected to Con-
gress. 
(D) Failure to comply with the disclosure provisions of this section shall 
result in civil fines of up to $10,000 for each individual disclosure viola-
tion under this section, if: 
An investigating member of the Department of Justice with proper au-
thority determines that the member of Congress has failed to comply 
with the disclosure requirements of this section. 
(E) The Department of Justice shall have the authority to bring civil ac-
tions against members of Congress for violations of this section in a U.S. 
District Court with proper jurisdiction. 
These sections authorizing civil actions are the most desirable so-
lution to combat the improper influence created by implicit quid pro 
quo agreements between public officials and campaign contributors 
or those providing independent expenditures.  Unlike criminal pen-
alties, civil fines would not unduly interfere with a congresswoman’s 
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constitutionally protected right to solicit campaign contributions be-
cause she would not have to fear being imprisoned or being subject-
ed to lengthy criminal proceedings for a potential violation.  Like-
wise, this statute would not chill the First Amendment protections 
afforded to those desiring to provide public officials with campaign 
contributions or independent expenditures because this statute takes 
a narrow approach in only allowing the Department of Justice to file 
civil actions against public officials—not the individual or group 
providing the donation. 
Although disclosure will not prevent all implicit quid pro quo 
agreements from materializing or granting improper influence, this 
statutory scheme is the first step in addressing these challenges by 
providing information to the Federal Elections Commission, the me-
dia, voters, and the general public about the types of improper im-
plicit quid pro quo agreements in the context of campaign contribu-
tions and independent expenditures.  This enhanced disclosure 
could allow the media to disseminate this information to voters and 
thus allow the electorate to make more informed choices about who 
to send back to Washington, D.C.  Not only will this increased disclo-
sure provide enhanced transparency, this new statute may actually de-
ter members of Congress from providing tangible benefits to con-
tributors as a result in “wink and nod” relationships altogether.  
Furthermore, without the threat of harsh criminal penalties in their 
arsenal, federal prosecutors would not be able to use this statute to 
engage in the types of devastating prosecutions that ruined the lives 
of Ted Stevens and Don Siegelman. 
In proposing a new standard to combat the lingering problems as-
sociated with implicit quid pro quo agreements, civil penalties are the 
best solution when considering the problems that can arise in the ar-
eas of criminal and constitutional law.  While requiring disclosure of 
these implicit agreements may not be a panacea in the area of public 
corruption, it is the first step in facilitating increased transparency 
and deterring public officials from providing improper tangible ben-
efits to those who provide them with donations or independent ex-
penditures. 
B.  The Need for a More Impartial Enforcement Process 
If Congress acts by enacting the proposed statute or a similar fed-
eral law targeting implicit quid pro quo agreements, other reforms 
should be enacted to facilitate a more independent process of inves-
tigating and enforcing civil penalties assessed on members of Con-
gress.  Without updated mechanisms that ensure the fair enforce-
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ment of these laws, the public’s trust in federal prosecutors may con-
tinue to wane while public officials’ careers may continue to be at the 
mercy of politically motivated prosecutors.  This Part urges Congress 
to adopt procedures that facilitate an independent process of enforc-
ing federal laws targeting public corruption and provides some sug-
gestions to Congress in achieving this goal. 
Besides the Stevens and Siegelman examples, it is well known that 
other former prosecutors, including Rudy Giuliani, have aggressively 
prosecuted public officials in hopes of furthering their own careers.110  
With the negative implications of these investigations, the federal 
government needs a more impartial way of enforcing public corrup-
tion statutes to prevent undermining the integrity of the justice sys-
tem and the public’s faith in this process.  Indeed, enacting new laws 
that combat public corruption through civil penalties is only one part 
of the solution—changing the ways in which the federal government 
enforces these laws is essential to achieving meaningful reform in this 
area. 
One way in which Congress could ensure greater fairness in these 
investigations is to provide the Federal Elections Commission 
(“FEC”) with an independent counsel.  This independent counsel 
could be granted the authority to investigate alleged violations of 
campaign finance and public corruption statutes.  Once this inde-
pendent counsel possessed sufficient evidence of a violation, the FEC 
counsel could turn the investigation over to the Department of Jus-
tice for further investigation or prosecution.  The independence of 
this counsel could mirror reforms made in other countries such as 
Canada where independent election commissioners have a much 
more significant role in investigating and enforcing alleged violations 
of campaign finance and public corruption laws.111  These independ-
ent election commissioners help facilitate a more impartial investiga-
tion process that avoids some of the problems related to the discre-
tion of federal prosecutors in the United States.112 
Delegating some of this investigatory authority to the FEC inde-
pendent counsel could serve as a “filtering-out” function that pre-
vents claims against public officials that may be initiated by authori-
ties in the Department of Justice who possess improper motives for 
 
110 Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 16 
(1997). 
111 See Diane R. Davidson, Enforcing Campaign Finance Laws:  What Others Can Learn from Cana-
da, 3 ELECTION L.J. 537, 538 (2004) (“The Commissioner is [] independent of the politi-
cal process and the government.”). 
112 Id. 
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beginning the investigation in the first place.  Although the structure 
of the FEC has led to considerable partisan gridlock over the years,113 
this problem could be avoided by granting this independent counsel 
the authority to turn over an investigation to the Department of Jus-
tice without requiring the approval of the FEC commissioners.  Allow-
ing the FEC commissioners to remove the independent commission-
er at-will by a majority vote could avoid separation of powers issues 
implicated by this proposal114 and could insulate the independent 
counsel from the partisanship that has characterized the FEC in re-
cent times.115 
Another possible reform related to the enforcement of public cor-
ruption laws is for Congress to have its own inspector general.  This 
congressional inspector general would be in charge of monitoring 
conflicts of interest within Congress and could recommend investiga-
tions to the Department of Justice.  Overall, this congressional inspec-
tor general could provide an additional level of monitoring that 
could contribute to a more independent process of investigation.  In 
terms of structure, this inspector general could reflect similar models 
adopted by state legislatures such as the Ohio General Assembly, 
which has a Legislative Inspector General who is charged with moni-
toring the legislators and their staff members for possible lobbying 
and ethics violations, and reporting these instances for further inves-
tigation.116  This congressional inspector general could report to 
members of Congress, but still have the authority to turn over evi-
dence from investigations to the Department of Justice for further in-
vestigation.  As long as the proposed statute does not mandate that 
the Department of Justice take specific actions once the inspector 
general turned over evidence from an investigation, then this pro-
posal would avoid separation of powers issues.  Since the evidence 
provided by the inspector general to the Department of Justice would 
 
113 See Amanda S. La Forge, The Toothless Tiger—Structural, Political and Legal Barriers to Effective 
FEC Enforcement:  An Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 351, 359 (1996) 
(detailing the difficulties faced by the FEC due to partisanship gridlock). 
114 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010) 
(explaining the separation of powers in place that limit Article II powers). 
115 I spoke with Professor Peter M. Shane, Moritz College of Law, regarding the possible sep-
aration of powers issues that could be implicated by this proposal.  Professor Shane con-
cluded that as long as the FEC commissioners could remove the independent counsel at 
will by a majority vote that this structure would avoid a “double layer of protection” from 
presidential removal as prohibited by the Court in the Free Enterprise case.  See Arizona 
Free Enterprise Club v. Bonnett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
116 See generally, The Ohio General Assembly Joint Legislative Ethics Committee:  Office of 
the Legislative Inspector General, http://www.jlec-olig.state.oh.us (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015). 
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serve an informational function, this proposal would not impinge on 
executive branch discretion to file charges against those who violate 
federal law.117 
Although these are general suggestions for ensuring an impartial 
and effective enforcement of public corruption laws, Congress must 
act in the near future to prevent federal prosecutors from unfairly 
capitalizing on their power by conducting investigations that are not 
only politically motivated, but also undermine the general public’s 
faith in the justice system.  Adopting reforms that incorporate either 
the FEC independent counsel or congressional inspector general are 
steps in the right direction in reaching these goals and preventing 
prosecutorial misconduct when combatting bribery the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Instances of public officials trading influence in exchange for 
campaign contributions and other items of value continue to make 
headlines despite the widespread coverage these stories receive in the 
media.  When members of Congress or other public officials engage 
in explicit quid pro quo agreements involving campaign contribu-
tions or independent expenditures that undermine the integrity of 
America’s government, there is little doubt that tough criminal sanc-
tions are warranted by these relationships.  Under the current stand-
ard, when legislators engage in “wink and nod” agreements with 
campaign contributors, these implicit quid pro quo agreements do 
not rise to the “explicit” standard where federal prosecutors can file 
charges.  However, these implicit agreements are still problematic 
because they provide improper influence and access to the legislative 
process and prevent elected officials from making objective decisions. 
Hence, a solution is needed.  Although criminal sanctions are ap-
propriate for more serious explicit agreements, these penalties are 
inappropriate for implicit quid pro quo agreements because they may 
deter constitutionally protected activities that impinge on the Ameri-
 
117 Because Congress may authorize any of its own committees to turn information over to 
the Justice Department, allowing the inspector general to perform such a function is 
simply delegating to that official an informational task that a legislative body may per-
form.  For that reason, the inspector general would not be an “officer of the United 
States” in the Article II sense and need not be appointed pursuant to any of the methods 
specified in Article II.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976) (per curiam) (“Insofar 
as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially of an investigative and informa-
tive nature, falling in the same general category as those powers which Congress might 
delegate to one of its own committees, there can be no question that the Commission as 
presently constituted [that is, not pursuant to Article II] may exercise them.”). 
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can political process.  Moreover, criminalizing implicit quid pro quo 
relationships could compound pre-existing problems associated with 
prosecutorial discretion. 
Accordingly, the most desirable way of addressing implicit quid 
pro quo relationships involving campaign contributions is through 
non-criminal remedies that impose civil fines on members of Con-
gress who fail to disclose these improper relationships under the new 
statute proposed in this paper.  While the effectiveness of disclosure 
is not universally accepted, this disclosure scheme is a step in the 
right direction by providing the media, interest groups, and voters 
with more information about members of Congress that will enable 
citizens to make more informed choices about who to support for re-
election.  On a related point, Congress must consider mechanisms 
that will promote greater impartiality in the manner in which the 
federal government enforces its public corruption laws.  Reform in 
this area has promise in avoiding current problems associated with 
federal prosecutors that risk destroying America’s faith in the justice 
system and the lives of those holding public office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
